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THEY ARE.

Turpe est sibi fucum facere.

Cic. de Orat.



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
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THINGS as they ARE.

WHERE there is so admirable a fund of good sense, and consequently of natural equity, as characterises the British Public, even though an epidemical illusion of error should unfortunately have prevailed for a time, the principle of recovery from it happily exists in that Public itself. But that depends entirely on its being engaged to combat itself, and to examine itself the causes of its misguidance, in which case the victory of truth is secure.

You may, it is true, just at the first, displease a British reader by laying before him any opinion repugnant to his own; but provided he sees, or rather feels, you neither attempt to mislead him by falsity, which he detests, or to win him by flattery, which he despises, you may depend on his ready forgiveness either of your reasoning with him, or of your setting him to reason with himself.

But constituted as man is, it would indeed be vain to imagine such candor universal to a whole people. We must naturally expect some exceptions. Such, for example, are those subalterns, who are merely under the sway of private interest, to whom it would certainly be doing too much honour to allow them any opinion at all; at least of their own. Yet these are they who are ever the most cool and rancorous enemies to the partizans of truth, of whom the better they think, they are sure to speak the worse. For this they have a double motive. An unsuppressible consciousness of the inferiority of their own part, makes them envy and detest the side on which they cannot help seeing the truth, with all their efforts not to see it. Then again they are compelled to appear more red-hot than others to make their patrons and perhaps, at length, themselves believe that they are in earnest, and that their zeal is not at bottom rank matter of interest. No wonder, however, these should look

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look on those as their enemies that could attempt to rob them of any thing so precious as that falsity they think themselves bound to defend. They would probably lose much of their consequence if they were inlisted only on the side of truth, which is never the bribing side, tho' ever the most richly rewarding one in the sense of honor, as well as of that only solid and true private interest which is inseparable from that of the nation.

But of all the absurdities that the Powers of Falsity, so congenially to their cause, oppose to the representations of Reason and Truth, the greatest surely is that of indiscriminately imputing the expression of any doubt about the wisdom of public measures to party-spirit, to private animosity, or to some dirty self-interest. To say nothing of the ridiculous injustice of arbitrarily assigning motives from their nature impossible to be ascertained; what can such a senseless interpretation imply other than the most undeserved injury to the nation itself? What? Here is a nation obviously inferior to none in the known world, for natural and acquired advantages, a nation evidently the sanctuary of Liberty, and the asylum of Reason, and which, in that light, very well deserves to be considered as the capital of mankind: and yet such a nation is not, it seems, supposable, among all her natives, to contain one subject that from a spirit of loyalty, duty, and gratitude, would oppose any error he might conceive pernicious to her welfare, without any view but the exquisite honor of opposing it. While any little insignificant private individual, that can set up for a minister of state upon the immense stock of half-a-dozen ideas, and those every one perhaps false, is allowed capable of being the head of a party, the nation herself is denied the honor of the possibility of her having a single partizan for her own sake. True it is, that this judgment is never formed but by those poor creatures who measure the hearts of others by the littleness of their own.

These it is, who, when any objections are, with the best of intentions, started to the current conduct of political affairs, hug themselves on their superhuman penetration and shrewdness, in discovering therein a malicious, envious, or interested disposition against some great man, that may, themselves can neither tell how nor why, have happened to captivate their confidence, under the circumstance of having very honestly, more than once done on his part, every thing necessary to prove how little he deserved it. Whereas the
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greatest probability should be, that any system of management acknowledging such an one for its director and controller, would, unless for the serious and fatal consequences sure to result therefrom, take so strong a tincture of burlesque and ridicule, as to be beneath all notice, or at the most, as to any personal sensations, could excite but such as one would experience at being forced to sit out a dull nonsensical farce.

To the admirers of such a personage, even though pre-assured of their injustice, which cannot however be so great as that which they do to themselves, I wish no worse, than for themselves not to hold their admiration so very cheap as not to examine whether they are not throwing it away, and that their undeception may not come too dear and too late. To these too I can very safely, and with the clearest spirit, protest, a perfect innocence of any intention to offend, either them, or even him they admire.

Every personality and every truth but that which stands ennobled by the stamp of Public utility, must be beneath the attention of the public. And in that Public I presume such a respect for itself, as for it to admit that a salutary truth would come with infinitely more honor, though it were but from some obscure garretter, than a pernicious falsity from a much lower character, that of a vile court-closeteer, who should have sold such a truth, let the price be what it would; a gratification either of avarice, or of vanity, or of both, in equal or in different degrees of both.

But among my readers (and what writer is there that does not hope for some?) there is a class, whose dissent from any opinion I could wish to see established, while it causes me the greatest concern, does not in the least lessen my perfect respect for them, and whose dissent is even a public calamity. These are they, who with understandings inferior to none, and especially with the clearest zeal for the good of their country, have even through that very zeal been hurried away the captives of first appearances, and of insufficiently examined opinions. But shall I say it? It is even upon the reality of that same amiable and praise-worthy zeal of theirs that I found all my hopes of the influence and persuasion of that truth, to which the bottom of their heart undoubtedly belongs, however Error, may have obtained by fraud or surprize, a momentary possession of the surface of their minds. Yes, It is among those whom that zeal unfeignedly animates, that, however contrary their opinion may have been, I depend on the fair and generous acceptance

tance of an intention resting exactly on the same principle as their own; even though they should still imagine they see superior reasons to remain unconvinced and subjected to their first impressions.

On these I am so extremely far from presuming to aim at imposing my own sense of *Things as they are*, that I am very justly submitting it to themselves. And while I am taking them for my judges, there is nothing I would intreat so strongly of them as to spurn all authority but that of their own reason, provided they do their own reason the justice to give it fair play, by leaving the entrance open to truth, in a suspension of all passion for the benefit of their judgment.

It is not these that will resent their not being despised enough for those truths to be suppressed or withheld from them, for fear of provoking in them a childish displeasure, which their interest in knowing such truths must so abundantly compensate.

By these it is that I shall dread nothing so little as being deemed an apologist for France, in my concession of any matter of fact in her favor; especially on my declaring beforehand that whatever truth happens to make for any enemies of this country, that truth I would tell to chuse, not most certainly by way of seeking to serve them, but of serving ourselves, whose ignorance of it can never be of advantage unless to our enemies.

We are not, I presume, as yet, so degenerate, so unmannered, or sunk to such abjection of spirit, as to be afraid of the truth, or rather, as not to embrace it whenever it offers.

And surely it must be infinitely better that the pointing out any weak side in our cause or proceedings should come from the hand of a fellow-subject than of a foreigner. A well-wisher will always combat a popular prejudice or error, rather with all the tenderness of a friend, than with the acrimony of an enemy towards those who maintain it. He will be sure to share the pain he will not perhaps be able to help giving, while he is less solicitous to avoid displeasing, than desirous to be of use in the communication of his ideas on those public measures, which in some measure affect every one, from the highest to the lowest of the nation.

Is there, for example, that subject in the British dominions so very low, or so very insensible, as that it should be matter of indifference to him whether those blessed continental

mental connections, so railed at, and so warmly espoused by the very self-same man, were made on a British, on a Hanoverian, or not impossibly, in the event, on a French footing : whether the immense sums exported to keep up those connections are not even worse than thrown away ; and whether our brave and dear countrymen are abroad on service against the *French*, or not on that of their own country, whether, in short, they are actually, (to make use of that phrase so quaint and so humane) “ *perishing with propriety*” or not ?

To examine then *Things as they are* in themselves, as they are in their own nature and essence, independent and in scorn of any relation to particular persons, is the object of the following sheets ; while all the favor requested of the reader is, that he will do the justice to himself, wherever he is tempted to condemn, of not pronouncing that condemnation, before he shall have judged ; or of not doing, in short, what is so frequently done, even in points of the utmost importance, peremptorily deciding, without ever judging at all.

As nothing can be more easily demonstrated than that the French were the aggressors in the present war, by their commencement of hostilities, with every circumstance of aggravation from cruelty and treachery, in no less than three places of America ; the repetition of so incontestable a matter of fact would be superfluous, but for its serving for a foundation to the justest of regrets. A regret that, whereas no political or military operations can deserve success, unless authorized by a principle of justice, we having that advantage undoubtedly on our side, should palpably endanger the consequences from that advantage, by embroiling this clear cause of ours with a foreign one, I will not dare to say absolutely unjust, but certainly an obnoxious one ; and an obnoxious one, it evidently is, to such a degree, that humanly speaking, it is much to be feared, that all the fair fruits produced by our own cause, will, from the unfortunate inoculation of that, take a rottenness at the very heart, that will render them so miserably perishable, as that it would have been perhaps better in the end, if they had never been produced at all.

But as in order to provide, before it is yet too late, a remedy for the evils incurred by this connection, it is absolutely necessary, however painful it may be, to probe it to the bottom ; let us take a fair and succinct review of the situation

tuation of Britain at the commencement of this present war: a war that France had so indispensably provoked, unless this nation would have been a traitor to herself, and have tamely endured injuries that tended to no less than the destruction of her trade, her interest, and her honor.

We were, in short, in a situation with respect to France, strikingly similar to that in which we stood towards Spain in our last war with that nation. A circumstance necessary to mention, not, most certainly, in any the least design to revive a dormant complaint of this nation for the usage she met with, in the prosecution, or rather in the non-prosecution of that war, but relatively to the present one, to remind of very essential transactions a people so apt, in their judgments, to make no use of their memory.

To say the Truth, the nation seemed entirely, not only to have forgiven, which might be a very generous part, but to have forgotten, which was a very impolitical one, the cruel usage she had undergone, in the sacrifice of her greatest genuine interests, to those spurious ones on the continent, that were made the pretext of the sacrifice.

Then it was, that that wretched state-subterfuge took place, when a minister who saw plainly that with his degree of obnoxiousness to the Public, he could not well hope to carry the court-measure resolved on of taking sixteen thousand Hanoverians and Hessians into pay, without the consent of parliament, with certain circumstances of mean imposition on a generous but passive people, as to the levy-money: then it was, I say, that the minister made a handle of the famous Chippenham election to play off that childish trick of diving out of one house and emerging in another. Then it was, that under cover of the satisfaction that removal gave, and in the heat of the scramble of private interests, the public attention to its own most capital concern was fatally diverted. All operations of the national war against Spain were soon as abruptly dropped, as the national pretensions, of which there was not so much as a word said, at the peace. Nay, even the merit to the house of Austria in our support of it against the ambition of France, at that immense expence both of blood and treasure, suffered detraction from the circumstance of those same sixteen thousand German mercenaries standing upon our pay-books, which it was averred, was the whole secret of our being intangled in that continental war. That, I confess, may not be entirely true. But so much is demonstrable, that, as to the opposition of
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obstacles to the French ambition, which was pleaded for that desertion of our own proper cause, and for the adoption of that of the queen of Hungary, there was not one of those nations in Europe that were content with the part of simple spectators, but what were more immediately concerned than we were in the issue of the French measures. And what was the issue of ours? An issue most worthy of those politics of ours, for which our nation is noted even to a proverb. About thirty millions more in debt, not a single national advantage gained, and to crown all, that indignity of yielding to send to Paris my-lords the hostages, which gave to the French king the air of a conqueror. Nay, he was even celebrated for his unparalleled modesty in vouchsafing us no worse terms of pacification.

All this was then remarked; but alas! nothing of it was remembered; when the breaking out of the present war with France on a footing so perfectly national, might, one would have thought, have put the nation justly on her guard against any proposal of a continental connection not evidently on a British footing; against any connections, in short, that should leave the least crevice of a pretence open, through which to steal in the re-placing of the Hanoverians and Hessians on the British pay-books.

But no. The sparks of the present war, of this war all our own, were scarce broke out, before Hanover, Hanover, with its ruinous importance, must at all rates, and by all means, be dragged into mention and notice. And here I solemnly declare, that I mean no reflection upon Hanover. It is but just, but fair to consider the subjects of that electorate as in some measure our fellow-subjects: nay, to consider their interest as so much an undivided one with ours, as, in the good we must naturally wish to ourselves, not to forget that good very justly allowable to result to them from our prosperity. No apostrophe, in short, could be more sensible than that not unfairly supposable one of Britain to her sovereign, "If you love Hanover, do me good, or at least, do not injure me, even for the sake of Hanover."

At the same time it must be observed, that it might not be impossible, even from an overstrained predilection for that electorate, to take measures pernicious both to itself and to this country. In which case this country, so very liberally ready, in compliance to her sovereign, to lavish her blood and treasures in the service of his foreign dominions, might however very justly, and without impeachment of that com-

plaisance, repine at her blood and treasures being lavished to no better purpose than to indanger or ruin those very dominions. That would indeed be hard. But facts will best show whether this has been the case or not.

I have observed that this war was a war all our own. Hanover had not the least concern in it. This is what I presume no one will contest, since it is even made one of the capital arguments in favor of the measures taken for the safety of that poor electorate.

The open rupture then between Britain and France was scarce resolved, before the affectation of fears for Hanover from the French was industriously broached, and laid the foundation for bringing it into play. The word affectation is not here made use of without design or without reason. Let the reader himself judge.

The war being so much our own, nothing can be more plain, than that there existed not the least color of plea or the least shadow of possibility of any German mercenaries being employed by us, while the war should continue on purely a British footing. Hanover is happily so situated that the French must have joined to the most infamous injustice, which would indeed be no wonder in them, the most perfect idiotism, for which I do not apprehend they were ever noted, if they had so much as formed the thought of marching an army to attack so remote a province, not only not worth the conquering, but impossible to be held by them by right of conquest, without the consent of the German Empire, which there was little likelihood for her ever to obtain. But this idiotism, so justly imputable to the French, in the case of their attacking Hanover, while Hanover should be trusted to the defence of its innocence, of its mediocrity, of the bond of the empire, ceased to be idiotism, and became a very wise and proper measure for them, from the moment that they had reason to think the defence of it would be considered here as a national duty. This entirely changed the aspect of things to them. In that point of view Hanover ceased to be that microscopical object, and they would have been fools indeed not to make their use of such a weakness in our politics as that would be, of renouncing the advantages of our insular situation in favor of an electorate which could only be endangered and never well defended by our renouncing them.

Nothing then being so obviously clear, as that our inviolable adherence to the wise and national provision by the
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act of settlement against our embarrassing ourselves with that province of the empire, was, in fact the part the most favorable to that electorate we could possibly take, as well as the least detrimental to ourselves; how came it that we did not make that part our choice? How came it that those fears were given out that were so calculated to realize a danger, which without their being given out, could never be but imaginary, while, if not imaginary, the fears themselves, the French only could have the worst of it in their not being so? This question the enemies of Britain will answer with pleasure, her friends with pain; who must find it extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to account for the allegation of such fears, but by the plea they were likely to afford of once more saddling the nation with Hanoverian and Hessian troops.

Now the passion for having those troops stand upon our pay-books, will not appear a whit the less credible for the risk to that electorate, by drawing it into a quarrel of which the issue might be fatal to it. They must be very little conversant in politics, or qualified to judge of the springs of actions in courts, who do not know that their greatest, truest interests, are often those that are the least known or consulted; nay, that they are often sacrificed to those little passions, or even weaknesses, of which the knowledge it is that gives the surest key of their conduct.

But if any one in the spirit of genuine candor shall think the question here begged, in the averment that the danger to Hanover from the French was purely imaginary, and insist, that it was absolutely a real one: that even the conduct of the French in the last war, when they forced Hanover into a neutrality, by an army marched to the borders of it, proves, that, at least, the renewal of the like danger might very well be dreaded, without affectation: if it shall be further added, that even the French court had actually thrown out menaces against that electorate; the reader, who will easily observe that in stating these objections the utmost fairness is intended, not to suppress any thing that may contribute to give a light to the point in question; the reader, I say, will be enabled to answer those objections himself by the following self-evident considerations.

First, If that danger of which the fears were made a handle to bring Hanover into play, was real, and the fears not affected; so much the better for Britain; so much the better even for Hanover itself; always provided that Britain should adhere to that her part of unconcern; which, while

she could never hope effectually to defend Hanover, would ultimately enable her to revenge and repair any wrongs it might have sustained on her account. And, in the mean while, the enemies of France could not have imagined a measure so palpably big with destruction to her troops and treasures, as the employing them on so base, so obnoxious, and so false a point of politics, as that of an expedition against that inoffensive province of Germany.

Secondly, Nothing could be a greater confirmation of the justness of treating any menaces from the French of falling a second time upon Hanover, with the scorn they deserved, than the consequences of that very step of sending Maillebois to compel the electorate of Hanover into a neutrality which was afterwards broke, if not for the sake, at least by the circumstance of sixteen thousand Hanoverians and Hessians being taken into our pay, in support of the house of Austria. A support in which we were undoubtedly interested, but not more than any of the other nations in Europe, who, I fancy, are as little curious of admitting the yoke of France as ourselves; but a support too, which we might have as effectually given, and have sickened France as soon in our own way, upon the element proper to us, as with so much less a chance for superiority, on the continent. But by these consequences of the French expedition against Hanover, I do not most certainly mean those troops being taken into pay on the pretext of the continental connection of that time, by which we were so shamefully frustrated of the benefits of our *own* war, which became from that moment, most flagrantly, *sine cure*, though not perhaps more perniciously than the present war is collaterally clogged by a foreign connection that will, so probably, worse than frustrate any benefits by it. No. I mean, that just jealousy and hatred of the French which that so iniquitous a measure in them rekindled in every truly German bosom. A spirit that did the queen of Hungary's affairs more service than even the swords which Britons and British money had, in her defence, drawn against France. And of this France is herself so very sensible, that she has been always more ready to grant Hanover a neutrality, than Hanover could be to ask it, and which, in fact, it has sometimes rejected. During a neutrality there is always a suspension of British pay.

But to go farther yet, and to state things to the utmost possibility of fairness. Let it be granted, that the consequence to Hanover of a neglect on our side, of its defence, would

would have knowingly exposed it to what it is but too plain neither we, nor its ally the king of Prussia so much nearer at hand to assist it, could possibly help, to the circumstance of the French getting possession of it. What then? It must be confessed that such an usurpation is a great hardship; but one of those hardships, humanly speaking, impossible to prevent, or but to endeavour at preventing, without the incurrence of much greater evils or dangers. That hardship, that oppression, grievous as it must be allowed to be, could, in the nature of things be only temporary; a transient storm. The damages to that province, it would not only have been cheaper, but easier for this nation to repair, and, if necessary, to revenge, with the applause of the whole universe. That Briton must not have had a spark of British honor in him, that at the making of the peace, would have wished its indemnification overlooked or neglected.

In the mean while that poor electorate would not need to scruple or regret its suffering a little in the reasonable view of such a reparation. That poor electorate can hardly complain of its condition having been rendered worse by its unity of subjection to the same sovereign. If, while Britain, with all her boasted accession of treasures from her extensive commerce, only sees herself so many millions the more in debt for her continental connections, that poor electorate, never remarkable for any trade, unless in hiring out its subjects, of which we have had such excellent bargains, could afford, thirteen years ago, to lend, upon a substantial mortgage, to Saxony, such a small sum as one million three hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, (and will any one suppose that this was its all?) Might it not then very well have born to throw less of the burthen of its defence upon us? Or what would have been better yet, both for us, and for itself, might it not with resolute resignation have committed its safety to the bond of the empire; and that failing, have trusted for the reparation and revenge of its injuries, to a people so well disposed towards it as we have shown ourselves, and who, on that occasion, would doubtless have doubly been so, with ten times the ability to give proof of that disposition?

Unfortunately the system the most ruinous for Britain and for Hanover prevailed. Those fears for Hanover, which, as to the effect they produced, were equally absurd whether real or feigned, were made the basis of the subsidy-treaty with

with the court of Petersburg, to which half a million sterling was to be paid for bringing the Russians into the German empire; an invitation for which that empire has doubtless great obligations to us.

But whether the very just menaces of his P. M. to the electorate, for a treaty in so great a measure, and so evidently levelled against himself, that even if he had been expressly named in it, the intention could not have been clearer; or, whether the queen of Hungary would not listen to certain preliminary lucrative stipulations in favour of Hanover, which she thought too interested or too hard a bargain, for both these reasons have been given, and perhaps both are true, this treaty of ours with the court of Petersburg was revoked, and virtually annulled, before the ink with which it had been signed was well-dry, by the subsequent one with Prussia. The first treaty was undoubtedly a bad, a very bad one: may that which was so abruptly substituted to it not prove in the end an infinitely worse one! But whether either of them was a measure taken on the footing of British councils, let the reader, on the light of his own reason, determine from the following considerations.

First, as to the Russia-treaty. The remoteness of that country from ours and from France, with whom alone we were at war, easily points out the aim of that treaty to have been the protection of the electoral dominions, on the part of his late majesty, as Elector of H-----, and on the part of Russia, a premeditated plan of hostility; against whom? Why even against our present individual magnanimous ally. But as to the British interest in protecting that electorate by that means, it may be fairly averred, that if in lieu thereof the French would have been so senseless, and so much their own enemies as to accept half a million sterling on the express condition to invade Hanover, and take the consequences merely as enemies to Great-Britain, and not in the character of auxiliaries to the empire, which would indeed totally change the complexion and substance of such a step; it would not have perhaps answered worse purposes for Britain to have given the French that half-million, which was stipulated with Russia, to come down into the empire with special intent to fall upon the Prussian dominions, where even their free quarters were implicitly marked out. And, indeed, it is but too probable that that same treaty, unfortunately for all parties, begot, in its consequences, the pacifying or rather the plaistering treaty with the K. of P. of whom it could not well

well be said, that he was either unjustly alarmed or offended at that with Russia, in which our new alliance with all the subsequent events, seem to have been wrapped up as in their seed-bud, and to have proceeded from it.

SECONDLY, as to the Prussian alliance: I presume it will hardly appear an unfair introduction to the examining whether it was a British measure or not, to state the following question.

Was Britain, singly opposed to France, reasonably to be held a match for France; or not?

If the affirmative is chosen, that is to say, if it is allowed that, every thing considered, Britain might, without too much hazard, have ventured to have stood upon her own strength, and upon that of the treaties already existing, the consequence is evident of the needlessness of a recourse to an expensive burdensome ally; that could only unsimplify our cause, distract our councils, and by the tenor of a joint and separate engagement, take our own fair honest points of view from us, to give us, what? his, of which it is impossible to say what they were, what they are, or what they could be. In the mean while, had the war been carried on against France on purely a national footing, without such continental rather incumbrances than connections, and much less aids, is there any thing so over-presumptuous in imagining that we could have kept topping the French at sea, in proportion as they should encrease their naval force; and that if our successes had been even less, they would have been more solid, and atchieved at an incomparably less expence? The Dutch in the infancy of their commonwealth, while they were struggling with the greatest power then in Europe, for their very existence, for their lives, liberties and property, could, from their war and their alliances being, happily for them, conducted on a purely national footing, even enrich themselves and lay the foundation of their following greatness during the course of a tedious and bloody war. It may perhaps be too much to say that this would have been exactly our case, but this may very safely be averred, that no good reasons can be given why it might not very possibly have been our case.

On the other hand, if the negative is chosen, that is to say, if it is denied that Britain was singly a match for France, and averred that it was a cautious prudent British measure, even but in the doubt of her being a match for France, to negociate a foreign alliance, for the greater safety of the nation. Be it so. Here is then for contracting an alliance the fairest

fairest cause imaginable assigned, and, indeed, the only one, that ought to be assigned; that of a supplement to any deficiency of strength on our side. Now though from premises so evidently just it is hardly possible to draw a false conclusion; or to think of attempting to pass such an one, the reader is, for his own greater security, intreated to solve to himself the following question.

If an augmentation of our strength against France was the object of the Prussian alliance, how could that augmentation be consulted, in singling out of the whole continent that very prince whom we were to pay for the war he was embarked in upon his own account, and who evidently had the greatest powers in it for his declared enemies? and what is yet worse, most of those his enemies our friends, our allies, our well-wishers, till this fatal treaty should make them otherwise? Was this the alliance then that was to lessen that our weakness, or cast the balance of strength against France in our favor? Or will the most zealous partizans for continental connections say, that this was the one we should have embraced, even if we could have got no other; which indeed would not be to be wondered at, while no other power, in its senses, would venture to connect with a nation that seemed so thoroughly under the impulsion of councils not her own?

The solution of the above question, even by the rules of the plainest arithmetic, will shew whether, admitting that we did well not to risk the fighting our combat with France, one to one, we did not pitch upon the most unpromising second in all Europe. But, alas! even our being thus palpably weakened by this accession of an ally procured under the color of strengthening our party, is not the worst of this measure. The blending a cause, so incontestably a fair one as ours, with his, even granting his not to be a foul one, but only considered as such by his lawful judges and peers, must not only very unpolitically engage us in a discussion of right, derogatory from the independence of the German empire, which must very naturally consider this nation, as an abettor of a prince it has thought fit to put under the ban, and of the justice, or injustice of which procedure no other nation can have any authority, unless applied to by the Empire, to take cognizance of it, but give to our enemies, the French, the colorable plea of imputing all our successes against them to their assistance of the Empire against those princes of it which are under that ban. A plea of which, so false and so favourable to France as it is, the British partizans of the
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German alliance nevertheless contribute to establish the validity, by admitting what is so justly deniable, that a war purely national and unadulterated with continental connections (and especially with such a connection too !) could not have been productive of equal, or rather greater advantages, or if less, still preferable for their being more solid in their being less invidious.

But granting that this cause of his P. M. was originally a fair one, nothing can be more certain than that his own procedure must have changed its hue. There is hardly the rawest novice in the knowledge of the political system of Europe, but must know that even the emperor himself is but the first subject of the Empire, and dares not, if he respects the laws, attack the pettiest prince of it, unless by a legal process.

His P. M. is certainly then not less subject to the Germanic constitutions than the emperor himself. Admitting that he had the justest reasons to suspect Saxony of bad designs against him, could he be justified in such a proceeding against this fellow-vassal upon a *suspicion*, which even upon a *proof* would not have been warrantable? Is it then to be wondered at, that *his* enemies should rather impute his magnanimous pillage of Saxony to the convenience he found in it, than to any motive of justice? Was not also that strange, that amazing measure of incorporating the Saxon subjects in his own troops, after compelling them to break their oath of allegiance to their natural sovereign, and to take it to himself, of a nature to be the despair of his apologists? I say nothing of that hard captivity of a respectable aged princess in her own capital, herself separated from her husband and her children, and very far from improbably, dying of the consequences of such usage. Yet is it possible for a British heart, that known seat of good nature and tender compassion, not to feel for the miseries of that unfortunate royal family, and the subjects of that fellow-protestant electorate?

But let this procedure of his P. M. not move us in a light of humanity; let the mention of it here be considered only as mere matter of declamation; at least there can no exception be taken to the mention of it, after the sentiments of DETESTATION with which the Prussian conduct was treated by his late M. “* *All the world*,” said his electoral

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minister

* Tout le monde sçait que le roi a absolument ignoré l'entrée du roi de Prusse en Saxe, que S. M. n'en a été instruite qu'.

minister at Ratisbon, in the Memorial delivered to the diet in his master's name, on the twenty-third of August, 1757, " *All the world knows that the king (of G. B.) absolutely KNEW NOTHING of the entry of the king of Prussia into Saxony ; that his majesty had no intelligence of it till AFTER the event ; that he DETESTED the hostilities that had broke out there ; that he advised against them ; that he had not taken, and had solemnly declared that he would not take any part in them.* "

Here it would be offering the greatest insult to the reader's understanding, to subjoin any comments on the inconsistency of such a declaration, with the recommendation at that very juncture of time of the Prussian alliance to this nation as a PROPER one ! I readily then leave it to his own reflexions. I leave it to him too, to consider, whether this was one of the reasons to be alledged for a minister's *changing* his opinion of those continental connections by railing against which, with more than tributinian fury, he had hector'd himself into power, and for which he has, no doubt, been so unjustly reproached, as if, in his change, he had less renounced an error than sold a truth !

Be it however said, for such an one's excuse, that he suffered himself to be dazzled, like the meanest of the populace, with the glare of his P. M-----'s first and never solid successes. A mistake, indeed, rather to be pitied in so great a man, than extremely to be wondered at, considering another egregious one of his, in imagining the set of people among whom he had thrust himself with so good a grace, might catch the " contagion " of his probity sooner than he the contagion of their corruptness, as if it was not, in nature, more likely for a sound sheep to get the distemper from a whole flock of rotten ones, than for a whole flock of rotten ones to be disinfected by one poor solitary sound one.

But be that as it may ; as to his P. M. certain it is that, though nothing so transitory as matter of personal character should enter for much into political alliances of nation with nation ; unfortunately for ours, that circumstance was too popularly prevalent, and contributed too much to the general infatuation. To say the truth, that prince has been extolled by some, and decried by others, to the most unjust excess. There is in fact no admiring him without shuddering. Nor indeed does any one deserve the honor of admiring

qu'après l'événement ; qu'elle a DETESTÉ les hostilités qui ont éclaté, qu'elle les a déconseillées ; qu'elle n' y a pris, et a déclaré, solennellement, qu'elle n' y prendroit aucune part,

ring him, that has not, at the same time, the sense to see, the courage to condemn, and the good nature to pity his errors. The justice owing to his heroic qualities should not hinder the animadversion due to his faults, especially if they are of such a nature as that humanity shall have suffered by them. In speaking with due praise of his magnanimity, do not let it be forgot, that he could not resist the unroyal temptation of putting Saxony to a methodical pillage, nor let it be denied that on more than one occasion, his virtues have suffered sad eclipses. Though a very indifferent politician, he may make excellent French verses, understand music very well, be a great philosopher, a great lawyer, a great general, a most religious and gracious prince, and yet, with all this constellation of excellencies not, in a political light, be a *proper* ally for Great-Britain; nor deserve to be set above one man in it a-dying "to kiss the tip of his little finger." But whatever sentiments of veneration we may here entertain for this great hero; at least we can hardly blame those unhappy Germans who impute all the misery and destruction of their country to him, for not concurring with us in that high admiration. It is not very natural for a man to admire much the splendor of the fire that is burning his house down, or the beauty of a torrent that in its rage is carrying away his family and all that is dear to him.

If it is true that he has declared himself the redresser of wrongs, of which wrongs, however, there appeared no complaints, and the protector of the German princes; it is also as true, that those provinces seem bent on not receiving him in that light. Nay such is either their portentous stupidity, or their ingratitude, that they have almost all leagued against him, whether papists or protestants, and even his own nearest relations. They tax him, no doubt, very unjustly, considering his tender and legal treatment of Saxony, Mechlenburgh, Anspach, &c. with trampling the great charter of Germany under his horse's feet, and of aiming to give that great Empire battalion-law. Instead, in short, of looking up to him as to their most gracious protector, they have treated him rather like a contumacious insurgent, too powerful indeed to serve their judicial process upon, but to which they do not deem him the less liable. Nor can it be imagined, that this nation can stand in a very favourable or very friendly point of light to them, for abetting a cause they have so proscribed, without surely being accountable to us for the irreasons for proscribing it. But is even the K. of P. himself obliged to us for our part as to

that career, so probably the career of perdition, in which we have encouraged him? Is it at all impossible that if the French have felt our enmity to be bad, he may feel that our friendship is still something worse?

And indeed, this so admired alliance, well considered, does not seem to have been, properly speaking, either a British or a Prussian measure. Was it a Hanoverian one? Still less. Nothing was ever more evident than that, at the commencement of the war, that electorate was in an interest totally opposed to that of Prussia. That such a disposition then became so suddenly changed considering the circumstances, it may be fairly presumed, was not so much owing to inclination as to fears, and those not groundless ones. And surely never was that remark of Cicero more verified, "That the dominion of fear is not of a durable nature*," than in the conduct of the Hanoverian ministry after the first engagement it had or entered, or been forced into with Prussia, by its dread of that storm which afterwards fell, with so much less reason, on the unfortunate electorate of Saxony; an engagement that did not hinder Hanover from falling a prey to a French invasion, which Prussia either could not, or would not take the least pains to prevent, nay, uncovered it by withdrawing the garrison of Wesel. The wisest part then that Hanover had to play, and most undoubtedly the most desirable one for Great-Britain, was the detaching itself as fast as possible from the side of a prince, whose procedure, let his cause be what it would, was certainly not of a nature for Hanover not to see the dangers of a connection with him, since his procedure had been so unjustifiable as to be DETESTED by its own sovereign and ours. And indeed how was it possible for the ministry of that electorate, however blind ours might be here, not to see the fatal and self-destructive tendency of the policy and projects of a prince so apparent to his dearest relations and friends, who in vain attempted to dissuade him? A prince whose alliance we were made to think so advantageous to us, though not only France had flatly refused it, on the pretext of her having been twice left in the lurch by him, but of which even the elector of Saxony spurned the offer at the very instant that the knife was held to his throat, that his capital and dominions were at the mighty conqueror's mercy, his own person, as well as his family,

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* Timor non diuturni magister est officii.

at his discretion. Yes! at that very point of time, his Polish majesty preferred all the distresses, all the horrors to which himself, his country, his wife, his children, were exposed, to any alliance with our magnanimous ally. Can we then well blame the electorate of Hanover for its readiness to get out as fast as possible of such an intanglement? In this spirit of very just policy, the Convention of Closter-seven was made, happily for Hanover, but infinitely more yet to the advantage of Great-Britain, who by this means became disburthened of a continental embarrassment that could be of no use but to sink both states at once, like two ships foundered by running foul of one another in a storm, that, by better steerage kept separate, might have held on their way very safe, and in friendly convoy to each other.

It is not then for making the convention that we can condemn that electorate, however we may condemn those that broke it. And here far be it from me to enter into the invidious task of seeking to bring into question to which side the horror of that perfidious breach is imputable. I dutifully hope, and believe, that it lay on the French; as the contrary would arm them with such just matter of clamor as that this nation needs not expect soon to hear the last of it, for that abettorship of it which would not only be such a reproach to her politics, but such an indelible stain to her annals. The very savages respect their calumet.

Be it then taken for granted, that it was not the Hanoverians who broke that convention, of which the punctual maintenance was the point on earth the most desirable for this nation; and of which any infringement on the side of the electorate, was therefore the least likely to be approved by her. It is a very great pity, however, that unluckily that despicable, unmilitary rout of Rosbach, in which the French, when opposed to the Prussians, behaved as if fighting had been less their cue than running away, since, in fact, they lost a very few men, should just have happened at that point of time when the Hanoverian resumption of the arms, lain down by the convention, might, by their enemies, be imputed to it. As for Britain, there was very little merit to her in the Hanoverians driving the French out of their country, in which they were perishing, and in which, most probably, their staying was the very worst thing they could have done for themselves.

Unluckily too, there was another circumstance, which, to our great and grievous detriment, concurred to lessen

to the Hanoverians the glory of their conduct, and that is, its not appearing quite so disinterested as it might have been wished. For even though this poor electorate, amidst all the evident indigency of its co-estates in Germany, could find the secret of being in a condition to lend them money by millions sterling, a secret to which, by the way, I fancy our nation would have been better pleased to have been associated, than either to the politics of that electorate, or even to the honor of its procedure on the rupture of the convention, yet it could not, it seems, afford any pecuniary effort for its own defence, but must have recourse to the pay-books of a nation that was forced to run herself more in debt, not only to keep that poor electorate out of debt, but, probably, to enable it, to lend out more millions of money at interest.

But if such a circumstance of interest was of a nature to throw some cloud on the lustre of that glorious resumption of arms, it might be said to have had, even as to that interest, such a counter-tendency to a much greater one, as to render it ultimately a dreadfully false step. But that indeed is no wonder. What passion is often so short-sighted or even so stone-blind as self-interest? The being replunged into all the dangers of a common-cause with a power proscribed by the whole Empire, and obnoxious to the greatest part of Europe, was in all good policy so undesirable a circumstance, that if the sweets of British pay were any part of the allurements, so much the worse for Hanover, and most certainly so much the worse for Britain.

But let that be as every British reader shall please to determine within himself, upon his review of that transaction, as to the honor, policy, and justice of it. The particulars of it are notorious enough for him not to need here fresh information, and plain enough for his drawing his own consequences. But here follows a point of infinite importance for him to judge and form his own opinion upon it, from the answers he will see reason to make to his own fair interrogations of himself.

If then, at that critical juncture, after Hanover had, by its own pure act and deed, without consulting Britain, relieved Britain from that burthensome embarrassment, when the replacing the troops of Hanover and Hesse, which was to be the consequence, I will not dare to say, the reward of that celebrated resumption of arms; was agitated in the British councils, that is to say if there was any such thing then

then in existence as British councils ; if, I say, at that juncture, one of your hackneyed ministers, that think all good policy centers in court-complaisance and in corruption, to which they give that turn, so worthy of such heads, in calling it charges of government, had been for hazarding, without the previous consent of parliament, so daring a step as that of once more engaging, and subjecting, the nation to a burthen of which it had been so happily lightened, where would have been the wonder, but of the unwearied passiveness of the people to endure it ?

But if, at that time, there was a minister who absolutely owed his being one to the favor of the people, obtained by their once more thinking him in earnest in his frothy declamations against continental connections ; a minister by the acclamation of the people ; a minister whose being hoisted into power was a kind of *plebiscitum* ; for such a minister, I say, to find, in that conjuncture, a *reason* for *renewing* that connection, above all others, with the continent, it is a merit in him of which, without presuming here to settle the nature and extent, I shall say no more than that not the most sanguine of his admirers, can surely complain of its being left to his ownself to judge and pronounce. Only, may he, in his judgment, not forget that the acceptance of a great office in the state is so bad an epoch of the desertion of a political principle, that people are too apt to impute it to nothing, being changed, but the person's being out of a post to his being in one, especially if it is a second or third repetition of the same trick !

By means, however, of that most expensive re-engagement with Hanover and Hesse, by which this nation is likely to lose so much, without its ever having been possible for her to get any thing, the broken link of our alliance with Prussia was soldered again : an alliance that may be so clearly demonstrated to have been neither a British, nor a Prussian, nor yet a Hanoverian measure. What was it then ? Let the reader himself give a name to it ; and its most appropriate name it will not be very difficult for him to give to it, if he will but consider its palpable tendency. At least, that of *Antigallican*, will hardly be thought a just one for it, unless, indeed, in the too great probability of its proving, though without doubt unintentionally, on our side, pernicious to a power originally raised by France into ballance against the house of Austria, and which it is so highly reasonable to suppose France would consequently be-
fore things were brought to the pass at which they at present
are

are, have effectually interposed to prevent being crushed: in which light France being weakened, is but so much the worse for Prussia, as France may be the less able to exert her influence to save him.

But there is one truth I will here hazard, a truth sovereignly unpopular, and therefore only the more necessary, and the more meritorious, to hazard it. It is this: The French are very justly said to be an unreasonable people. But they must be more unreasonable yet than they can well be imagined, if they do not forgive us all that we have done against them, in favor, mark, not only, of all that we have done against ourselves, but of all the superior good they have so much reason to think will ultimately redound to them, even from the very mischief we have done them.

There was a picture * given some time ago in very emphatic terms, of the "distressed condition of France, fallen from its alarming power and greatness into the lowest state of distress and impotence, unfortunate in its military operations in every quarter of the globe; beaten all Europe over both by sea and land; its fleets sailing only to be destroyed; its armies marching only to run away; without trade, no credit; stopping payments, protesting bills, and to all intents and purposes, a bankrupt nation; their king, the princes of the blood, the nobility and the clergy carrying in all their plate to be coined, for the present extreme exigency of their affairs; disappointed and baffled in all their schemes on the continent; and taught to think no more of *invasions* by the destruction of the only fleet they had left." All this is true, or so near being the real truth, that at least it is not essential here to scan exactly the difference. But what of that? What even of the apparently fair consequence which that ingenious writer draws therefrom? *to wit*, "That France, unable to carry on the war, will soon be reduced to the necessity of *suing for peace*." Instead of which, it is well known, she has spurned with barely not scorn and derision, the offers that were made to her of peace. Alas! the solemn truth is, that that distressed, that beaten, that bankrupt, and, I can justly add, that slavish, and in that sense a worthless nation, and, as one may say, a nation not company for ours, is, for all that, thanks to our politics, thanks to our so well chosen continental connections, already, observe, already, and without appeal to future contingencies, as good as in possession of little

* Letter to two GREAT Men! p 8.

little less acquisitions than we have got from her in all the quarters of the globe, and, to all appearance, may promise to herself the being the very greatest gainer of all the powers actually engaged in the present war. A prospect she absolutely owes to the part we have fatally taken against ourselves: for it can hardly be said she owes it to herself. No. Our blunders are her game, and our want of policy an over-abundant supplement to the deficiency of hers.

I say nothing of Minorca lost: let it pass in the account for nothing. But as to Flanders, of which France is already equal to the being in possession, what is there she can have to wish for her advantage more than that amazing insensibility and unconcern with which we seem to behold that country as good as in her possession, while our attention is all ingrossed by Canada, Guadaloupe, Senegal, and add, if you will, Martinico? For not all of them together are perhaps above half the importance to France, for a thousand obvious reasons, as that accession of dominion in Flanders, nor of such dangerous consequence to Britain. This is the country, of which even that indolent prince Charles II. who was so little of a British king as to be a pensioner to the French one, had however so just a conception, and so quick a sense of its fitness to aggrandize France, beyond all measure of British policy to bear, that he declared that he would take the field in person, rather than suffer it to fall into her hands. And time and events have been so far from bringing any alterations capable of weakening this apprehension, that there is actually now incomparably more reason than there then was, to dread the mischief to Britain from such an addition to the power of France, who may keep that country at so much less expence, and to whom it is so much more convenient by its adjacency than to the house of Austria.

If then France could plan a disposition of the minds of the people here, she durst not, she could not form a wish more favourable to her than the present indifference and carelessness that prevails here about the hold she already has of Flanders. Nay, so fatal is it for Britain by her unaccountable politics to do more service to France than ever she could do to herself by her own, which, for example, under Lewis the fourteenth, brought her to the brink of that ruin from which ours saved her at the peace of Utrecht; that there are among us here, such as that if they were emissaries paid by France to advance her greatest interest, they could not do it more effectually than they very innocently of that

that intention do ; while the fire of their zeal against her seems to have burnt up all their discretion. These are they who, to support the falsest of all merits, that of a continental connection on the most un-british footing imaginable, will have it, that we could have done nothing for ourselves without that connection, and that it is to that alone we owe those successes, which, if it were true that it was so, we had undoubtedly much better have been without. This falsity, however, so cruelly, so injuriously to this nation, propagated by those of whom there is at the same time no more reason to suspect the patriotism, than to admire the judgment, subministers to the French, the fairest of all pleas of merit to those allies our continental connection has given them ; since, as they will very justly observe, we ourselves confess that our cutting out employment for them in Germany, was the cause of all our successes against them elsewhere. A plea which those allies can hardly not respect, or not admit, while there are not wanting even Britons, that with an air of authority attest the validity of it against truth and against their own country.

There are too, who imagine that the loss of Flanders would only fall upon the queen of Hungary, whom they detest, on a notion of her being ungrateful, without their ever standing to examine whether, all circumstances considered, she did not more deserve to be pitied than to be blamed ; whether she was not forced by ourselves into that unnatural alliance of hers with France ; or whether she did not desert us till after we had palpably deserted ourselves. Such a loss they then, on their partial view of things, think to be no more than what she deserves, not considering how very hard and how very silly it would be in Britain to consent to the punishment of herself for the demerits of the Q. of Hungary. And yet this must inevitably be the case, if Flanders should remain with the French, who ought not to desire a better chance for their game, than that our being bent on retaining all our conquests from them should effectually divert our attention from a point, their carrying of which would bid so so fair to enable them in time to recover them all. The French must be idiots indeed if they would not give ten such countries as Canada, that hardly brought them in a single livre, though so convenient for us, with Cape Breton itself, (the fishery of which the revenue of about forty-five thousand pounds a year was, in fact, nothing equal to the advantage of its being a reservatory for their seamen,) and Guadaloupe, of which

which the revenue was not near so great to them as it may be to us; to give, I say, all these for the acquisition of Flanders, on which they have ever had an eye, for very obvious and natural reasons of situation and interest. “*Pour s’arrondir* (as they phrase it *de ce cote-la.*”)

It is very well known that in the interval between the reduction of Bergen-op-zoom by the French, and their forming the siege of Maestricht, it was strongly agitated in the French councils, whether, in the consciousness of their naval inferiority to us, they should not of their own accord abandon their colonies to their fate, that they might throw the whole stress of their power into their land-operations on the continent, upon the obvious enough plan of subduing the Dutch, and having all their ports, shipping and stores at command. Saxe and Lowendahl were strongly for this resolution being taken. Perhaps nothing hindered it but the fears of the empire and of the house of Austria; of which fears our great politicians have taken such effectual care to dis-embarrass them; so that a resolution, which even at that time would not have been perhaps a very hazardous one, is become in the present aspect of things, especially should the French get Flanders, not only a more practicable one, but even, in some measure, a necessity.

With that advantage then of the possession of Flanders, united as they are with Austria, and at least on no ill terms with Spain, would Holland be any more than a breakfast to them? Or is this prospect so very chimerical, or so remote an one, as not to give Britain alarms the juster and the more wanted for her present amazing insensibility and unconcern, about a point upon which her own safety and interest so capitally depend? ---- Is not the fatal bow-string already almost round her neck? And what if, neither in good policy, nor indeed in the possibility, it is not just at present the time to make her feel the drawing of it so tight as to hurt or strangle her; is that a reason that such a time may not come? ---- Those keys of Flanders, Ostend, and Nieuport are already in the hands of the French; and if they needed any excuse to get hold of the remainder, have not the incidents to which our own conduct have given birth, abundantly furnished them with one? And, what is not less bad for us, doth not that indifference of ours about it give them hopes and a facility that will be an eternal reproach to us?

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to fear; I say the worst, according to the opinion of those who are for seeing that territory in her hands, with indifference, so we keep Canada, Guadaloupe, &c. It is not at all impossible, that she may make that acquisition, and we not retain even those so loudly sounded conquests of ours, concerning which there are now such grave, deep, and learned disputes among us, about the comparative value of the one to the other, when it is not absolutely clear that we shall be able to hold any part of them long, or at all, after the peace.

Here if any well-meaning Briton shall interrupt me, with an honest indignation; if he shall say "Who can force us to let go our conquests? not the so often beaten French surely! No, nor all Europe, while we have a fleet evidently a match for the whole naval force of Europe. Let them take Hanover and welcome: let France take Flanders from that ungrateful vixen of Hungary; much good may it do them with it! but who shall tear from us Senegal, Canada, Guadaloupe, &c. while we keep our ascendant at sea?"

To this I answer, that I am intirely of his opinion as to the ignominy and folly of making conquests only to restore them; but that his indignation will be more justly directed against the promoters of those continental connections, which not being made on a British footing will have furnished to France the only handle she could have of engaging the other powers of Europe, to consider their restoration as a matter of justice to her in the plan of the next general peace. But as to those who are for slighting or setting at defiance such an intercession of the other powers, on the principle of our ability to continue the war, and stand it out with all of them; may I ask the following question:

If after running thirty millions more in debt, of which those same conquests are hardly more than a valuable consideration; if after so much of our blood spilt, we are however in a condition to brave all or the greatest part of Europe leagued against us; were not we then, at the beginning of the war, authorized to think ourselves a match for France singly? Why make of that false allegation of inferiority a plea for burthening ourselves with such a continental connection as must so probably not only frustrate any success we might collaterally have, but embark us in the maintainance of them against all Europe, with all the powers of which, as a commercial nation, it was
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so much our interest to keep up and cultivate the most amicable understanding?

As it is, have we not reason to fear that with a debt enormously encreased, with a credit rather on the wane, with the live-force of the nation not a little lessened, we shall not have only the preservation of our conquests to provide for, but even the very existence of our nation to defend?

Is not even our dominion on an element I hope we shall always call our own, already somewhat abridged? Has not there, since the commencement of the war, been an obvious call for our sending a fleet up the Baltic? Have we *dared* to do it? Has not the *VERO* of more than one northern power been cavalierly enough signified to us?

Have we not been obliged to wink hard at the injuries and indignities of other nations, to whom the fear of drawing more enemies upon us than we already have, (and, to say the truth we have full enow already,) has made us lower our tone, and take very bad reasons of their misconduct towards us for good ones? A fear we need never have known, if our war had been originally with France alone upon a purely national footing. Is there not a nation, that now actually supports France underhand with her treasures, with whom we are obliged to treat in a kind of deprecatory strain, for which that nation despises us, though it is her interest not directly to break with us: a circumstance which, but for that fatal continental connection of ours, was perhaps more to be wished than dreaded. So true it is, that when a nation once goes off her own natural bias, and adopts a foreign one, she is no longer the mistress of her own sentiments and measures. She can hardly take a step that is not a false one.

From the moment then that our cause became a double one, by the strange policy of grafting on it so heterogeneous an one as that of Prussia, we lost all the solidity of any successes we might have. And to what purpose that ingraftment? It is common indeed, in dealings, to negotiate collateral security, but never, as I imagine, to procure, at an infinite expence, a collateral risk. Such a circumstance of wisdom was, it seems, reserved for our politics. In short, after such a mis-alliance as ours, it became almost indifferent what we did. We might take Senegal, or let it alone; take Canada or let it alone; take Guadaloupe or let it alone: nay, add Martinico, if you chuse it; and yet all this may signify little or nothing to
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the sum of things, which intirely in consequence of a cause with which we had so little to do, must for ever be determined by the fate of the continent, and not by that of those remote and comparatively small objects. Nor does this way of reasoning in the least detract or derogate from the just estimate of those acquisitions. He must be an idiot that is not sensible of their value, or worse yet than an idiot to pretend himself not sensible of it. They ought to be, beyond all doubt, considerable, very considerable accessions to our interest, as well as a diminution, at least to present appearances, of that of the French. But the more this is true, the more reproachful is it to those whose fault it is that such successes should be frustrated by a collateral foreign measure that was and sure to worse frustrate them. In which light, they give one no idea but such a painful one as, that of seeing a superb superstructure which, the higher it is raised from a sandy foundation, must be but the more certain to fall and with the greater ruin.

For those acquisitions then, if we have not even already paid too dear, in the sums of money, and in what is more precious yet, in the blood they have cost us, (may it not be in vain!) is there not too much room to apprehend, not indeed the duration of the war with France, in which, on a maritime footing, she would probably find her account less than we should, but of the enmity of so many powers in Europe, with whom even the interests of our commerce, might make us wish to cultivate the strictest harmony; to say nothing of the political conveniency to us of their not being the friends of France? And is it not our foreign, our truly foreign politics, that will have made them such? Or was the firing of the Tower-guns for the stupendous victory at the late battle of Torgau, of the Prussians over our some-time friends and always natural allies, the Austrians, an admirable piece of policy in the way of detaching these from the side of France? Or, if so admirable an one, how came that kind of declaration of war against the Austrians, in favor of our inviolable attachment to our magnanimous ally omitted before, when his two victories, those of Rosbach and Lissa, passed away unhonoured with such a demonstration? Yet that at Rosbach was more particularly our concern, being obtained over the French our *proper* enemies. Account for these inconsistencies who can? But, certainly, it would be doing a simple minister too much honor to impute to him a step of such infinite consequence;

as if there was any necessity of proving himself very capable of pushing to any length those measures which, upon his own authority, might be called the worst ones imaginable; or of convincing the world, that where his own private interest was depending, he could be as unconstant as the wind, and only obstinate where the interest of the public could very well have spared his not giving himself the air of being so.

Notwithstanding, however, the firing of those guns, it may, I presume, be allowed, without any impeachment of the strictest loyalty, not only in the light of humanity, but even in a political respect, to deplore the fate of Germans unmercifully massacring one another, to the great diversion, and most undoubtedly to the great advantage of the French, and of the French only.

These must naturally, in every German that is butchered in this civil war, see an enemy the less to the encroachments they are never but meditating on that great barrier to their ambition, the German Empire. But for that Empire to be divided against itself, while they have the honour of appearing to seek its harmony, and the British nation has the odium of appearing to foment its divisions, is such a solid triumph to them, that they may well exult in it, and comfort themselves for the comparatively trifling mischief we may have done them in their navigation and colonies. In this light then, and to every clearly British head, I appeal whether it is a false light, every clearly British heart must feel with little difference for Prussians and Austrians perishing in that detestable continental war, through which we have, as it was so easy to foresee, been so fatally wire-drawn into a chaos of imbroils "of false measures, and expences without bottom or end*."

Is it not then high time for the people of Britain to see through the imposture of such as have so mercilessly exercised upon them the art of procuring them agreeable dreams, out of which, if they do not take care, they will not awaken but too late, in the midst of inevitable surrounding ruin and perdition? While all this lulling them asleep, all this soothing, all this flattering them, will have only been to obtain their passive acquiescence in their being fleeced, or sent to the shambles, not only without a single rational prospect of advantage to this country, but even to those foreign ones upon the continent, to which this country seems doomed to be the sacrifice in vain.

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And here I hope the reader will do me the justice to observe, with what perfect candor, and even tenderness, I speak both of Hanover and Prussia. Be it right, be it even laudable, for us to have stripped ourselves; to have run in debt over head and ears; and even to make victims of our own countrymen, and all in order to save or serve those foreign countries: but to do all this, to no better purpose than most probably to *ruin* those countries; to *ruin* them, I say; is not that rather too much? And yet this is not all that we have to repine at in such blessed politics.-----*What more?* Is not there the greatest likelihood that the French, and all those enemies we shall have made, by those politics, will ultimately be the only benefited by them?

Towards clearing up this point, let us but consider the probable issue of those treasures sent to feed that war on the continent which, like impure bodies, could only be the worse for feeding: This is but too plain, since, as to his P. M. at least it had so much of the civil war in it, that all his victories* could neither grace nor strengthen him. Rationally speaking, they could only inflame a reckoning already too great for him to pay; and inflame it without setting him above the necessity of paying it; while, it is well, if we are not called upon as being jointly and separately bound with him to make good any deficiency by his insolvency, especially since we are so full of the boasts of our immense riches. The glare, in short, of his successes, afforded, even to his truest and best friends, no light but the melancholic one by which to read in them the more clearly the greater danger of a catastrophe not in his favor. To encourage and abet him then, in such a career, was evidently a measure that, in its tendency, rather threatened to procure his fall, than it had the merit of a support to him.

And that he should be supported, was obviously, for a thousand reasons, less our interest than that of France, who must have laughed heartily to see us, while at war with herself, streighten ourselves to give those sums which, but for her distrust of his P. M. or but for the contempt she had of those Prussian politics we afterwards, on her refusal, so eagerly adopted, she would not herself have grudged to support a power that was the only one capable of ballancing her ancient rival the house of Austria. Well then, those mil-

* *Omnia in bellis civilibus sunt misera, sed nihil miserius quam ipsa victoria.*

millions so impolitically drawn from us went to Germany. There they must consequently, even amidst all the horrors of war, contribute to augment the pecuniary mass in those countries. And if that maxim is true, that men follow money, even the temporary depopulation of Germany by the war, may not be very long repairing, considering the amazing affluence of specie to it from so many powers making it, as it were, the rendezvous of their armies.

Should then his P. M. happily extricate himself out of his plunge, or come off conqueror, which is not quite so likely, we are still evidently the poorer for all the sums exported to Germany to support him. But then indeed we shall have carried our point. I do not examine how far from clear it is, its being a point, which we ought to have wished to carry; or whether it is not rather the point on earth the most favorable to the permanent interest of France.---- That discussion would lead me too far, but surely it is no uncandid supposition, that in the first fair opening to a peace, from any decisive success his P. M. already so justly tired of the war, and so interested to get out of it, would hardly wrong that opinion himself had given the world, from his treatment of Saxony in 1741, and in more than one instance of France herself, his natural wished ally, not to mention his conduct to this nation in the affair of the Silesia-loan. We could not then have been intirely surprized if our subsidies should have produced nothing better than a sacrifice of our interest, either to his conveniency, or, what is a more gentle interpretation yet, to his necessity of a peace.

Yet this supposition of a sacrifice of our interest, which would hardly be carried the length of his P. M. declaring war against us, at least, immediately, if but for shame-sake, is even the most favourable one. For it supposes that his P. M. will not, as I sincerely hope he will not, be crushed, nor be the victim of the storm he is accused of having himself raised. But if that should unfortunately be the case; those immense sums of ours are not only to our own impoverishment, worse than thrown away in subsidies, productive of nothing but the ruin of an ally, for whose support their being intended must naturally make us enemies of the powers leagued against him; but from the very nature of money to enrich and strengthen those countries, in which it centers, that consequence must evidently turn against ourselves by those countries submitting to, or falling

under, the conquerors at enmity with us. If this is a forced or false conclusion, in what is it a forced or a false one?

Alas! there is more yet against us, in that application of the clearest of our wealth, which were it to go on but a little longer, would make a guinea as rare in the land as an Otho. Nothing is more probable, and for this averred probability I appeal to the best judges, the merchants themselves, whether a very considerable part of the specie exported to Germany intentionally against France, is not less likely to find its way back again here, than into France; yes, into France itself, not only directly through so many channels of communication as are open to it, by its present intimate connection with the German empire, but also indirectly through other parts of Europe, in virtue of its inland trade, which the destruction of its navigation has rather increased than diminished.

Nay! Should even some of our continental remittances return to us again, in what shape would they for the greatest part return? Still in a bad one for Britain; since it would chiefly be in that of loans to increase that enormous burden of her public debt, under which she is already sinking, while she is forced to appropriate the clearest of her revenue to the payment of a tribute, in form of interest, to foreigners, whether they are friends or foes, without any advantage to herself from such loans, unless the throwing away the produce of them can be called so, on bad bargains for succours she could never want, or, perhaps, on subsidies so admirably well calculated as to ruin both herself that granted them, and those to whom they are granted.

And here one unsuppressable remark is candidly offered to the intelligent reader's own examination. Let him, if he can, name that nation that now is, that ever was, or, humanly speaking, ever can be, on the face of this habitable globe, that its insular situation and naval power considered, might, so justly in point of policy, assert itself above any necessity of paying subsidies, as, in point of honor it is, by its circumstances, above the receiving any. Nothing would probably confirm this more than a fair history of our subsidies, of their motives and their effects, in which would be seen how few, very few indeed, of those burthenome continental connections could be rightly said to be on a national footing. It would be seen that our subsidies have been ofteneft lavished away upon powers that did, or could do, nothing for us; that laughed at us; or that deserted us in our greatest need. Some of them indeed

deed very wisely and thriftily employed the sums they drew from us in opening new channels of trade, and setting up manufactures to rival ours. Others, especially some of the little blood-shop-keepers of Germany, squandered them away on articles of luxury, stately palaces, fine gardens, French comedians, and Italian singers. At least, it is not all of them, that by the help of our subsidies could treasure up enough to enable them to lend out millions at interest.

Compute then the sums that have been actually no better than thrown away in foreign subsidies; compute those expended on continental wars, which, if not upon an unnational footing, were, at least, conducted upon unnational plans of land-operations; add to these exactions of the folly of our foreign politics the sums lavished away in domestic corruption, employed in purchasing of the subjects with their own money, and to the injury of themselves and their posterity, their acquiescence in some unnational points, of which unnational points there needs not exist a stronger proof than that very corruption itself, since who corrupts to a good, or rather not to a bad end or purpose? and how little will the aggregate of these articles of false expence want of accounting for the whole of the national debt? Perhaps without them the nation, instead of being in debt, might have had many millions in her treasury. What a thought is that? And yet well considered, how infinitely far short of chimerical? But as it is, at least, we may hope, that when there is not a farthing left to spare for the feeding of that monster Corruption, it will die of itself, and in its death bring some consolation to the country it will have ruined.

But how different the consequences of sending away all our specie to the continent on a foreign footing, from those of sending it on a national one to our colonies in America! Where, besides its testifying our just and parental regard for them; besides its enabling them to withstand and subdue our common enemy; besides its animating their industry; after having performed all this valuable service, there is hardly a six-pence of it but returns into the mother-country, for the further good of its trade and manufactures. Here is no extravasated blood; but a just circulation that distributes health and nourishment through body and members.

Whereas, if the so much greater exportation of cash to the continent in the support of the war not our own there,

should be fairly weighed, and the merits of it scanned by its never but obvious tendency and effects, it will not at all sound overstrained or exaggerated to aver, that had the money been shipped off, and the chests of it without buoys and buoy-ropes, sunk in the midst of that channel which divides the continent from our island, but divides it in vain; such a disposal of the money would not only have been better for the country from which it went, but even for that to which it went.

But that nothing might be wanting to complete the beauty of our measures, the sacrifice of money alone would not satisfy: but that incomparably more regrettable one of British lives must be added, most certainly as little to the honour of the nation, as both the one and the other are for its interest. Now this is a point in which no one that can or dares think for himself, which, I confess, is not a little rarity, needs dread any imposition unless it should be from himself. The facts, the circumstances on which to build a decision are so manifest, that it does not at all require any knowledge of court-secrets, or admittance into the closets of princes to ascertain the truth.

It is in every man's power, by taking a fair review of the state of things on the continent, to pronounce, from his own knowledge and judgment, whether, since the commencement of the war, there did not exist a time in which it was proper, commendable, and perfectly right, to make such a declaration as, that not so much as "half a man" should go to Germany. If then, such a point of time did once exist, will he be so good as to try to settle to his own satisfaction, in what other point of time it was, that there existed a good reason for a *change* of that opinion from any *change of circumstances*, or at least to specify to himself wherein that change of circumstances consisted, unless indeed for ten times more reason to adhere to that opinion against sending so much as "half a man?" But without proving such a change, for any one by way of apology for a desertion of principle, which time and facts render imputable to motives of interest or of vanity (it is not five farthings matter which) gravely and sagaciously to produce such an uncomfortable aphorism as that "change of circumstances justifies change of opinion," can hardly be less ridiculous than the Sancho-Pancha strain of picking the English proverbs, and giving us at random such pretty ones as these, "All's well that ends well" ----- "Success makes a fool

“ seem wise”---“ A wise man hath more ballast than sail.”
 -----“ God hath provided no remedy for our obstinacy.”
 -----Very just, very sensible all these, if they are but well applied.

But leaving such a defence to its deserved derision, let it be asked, whether there was a measure which, if Belleisle himself had dictated our councils, could have bid fairer for the interest of the French, than that, since they could not quite so conveniently come over to us, we should, at an enormous expence kindly accommodate them with the transport of our countrymen to the very spot in the globe they could most have wished them, for their courage to be thrown away, and for the little that it could be in their power to do them material damage, while even their victories could decide nothing but the prolongation of the war? Behold them in a territory naturally a friendly one to us, or at least neutral! In a country where, in former days, surely not less honorable days, Britons made another figure than in their present subaltern one to a foreign general, who though himself a subject, is not even subordinate or accountable to that very nation which pays that very army and that very general, under whom they are suffered to make such a figure! A circumstance scarce to be paralleled in all history. Would the French, do you think, with all the passive mean-spiritedness of an enslavement to despotic power have submitted to such an arrangement? Times are indeed changed; but are they in such a point, changed for the better, from those, in which an Emperor of Germany was but a hired soldier, that served in the English army for his pay, which it is true he did not earn?

In the mean while the German empire shows itself determined to look on our troops not as enemies to France, but to itself, especially since that neutrality which was early offered to Hanover, having been rejected, not at all you may be sure, in consideration of the British pay, but purely in an heroic view of satisfaction to his P. M. for the offence given him by that subsidy-treaty with Russia, which was broke, it seems, with as much levity as it was made, and certainly with more impolicy. In Germany then, so ill disposed towards us, what were our troops to do there? “ Defend Hanover.” Was it either worth defending, proper to defend it, or rather was it not calling the enemy, was it not realizing the imaginary danger to it of an attack, by letting it be supposed that it would be

defended by us? ---- "they were to make a diversion, to keep the French from contributing to crush the K. of Prussia." May be so. But was it the interest of the French that he should be crushed! Might they not, at the beginning of the war, have been very safely trusted with their finding expedients to save from destruction an irreconcilable enemy, to a power naturally their rival, if our politics had not made it cease to be so? ---- It may be said "Our troops were to protect and secure to the empire its freedom, oppressed or in danger from the house of Austria." Very well. But does an empire obstinately set against the acceptance of such a service, deserve that service should be done it? Are we to ruin ourselves, in order to cram its freedom down its throat? It is often possible to hurt people, whether they will or no; but is it in the human power to serve people, whether they will or no? --- "We are acting against our natural and proper enemies the French; we will pursue, we will attack them wherever they can be encountered." That is very great to be sure. But ought we, for that, to have made so many more powers our enemies? Ought we for that to have risked the incurrence of that kind of excommunication formed by the opinion of universal society, which would be so much more formidable than a papal one, by our espousing, for the sake of that conveniency, a cause, in which, just or unjust, the procedure at least has, in a very capital part, been so detestable, and so detested, even by its own partizans? Are we for that to feed the flames of war in a neutral territory, and abet the devastation of provinces belonging to Powers that never hurt us, never offended us, unless in not thinking of the cause of one of their own co-estates, of which they are so evidently themselves the legal judges, in not thinking of it, I say, just as we are pleased to do?

But granted that the laws and rights of nations are not in the least repugnant to this our support of the Prussian cause now fatally identified with that of Hanover and ours, against the laws of the Empire, with which we have not the least shadow of a dispute on a British account, granted; that the secondary figure the troops of Britain make under her own stipendiaries, is highly honourable, and worthy of the majesty of the nation; what can be said for this measure in point of that good policy which always dictates the propriety of commensurating means to their ends? Was there ever the least prospect of the troops we sent effectually

really answering one valuable purpose? Was there even, humanly speaking, a likelihood of gaining even by what victories were, or could be gained, any advantage that would compensate the expence of treasure and lives, and the odium that must be incurred by their being sent on such an ungracious errand? And yet, have not they already done more than could be justly expected, towards fulfilling the object of their mission, if their mission could be said to have any object? Surely every British heart must bleed, at the reflexion on the hard fate of those our gallant countrymen whose bodies, no-one can well tell why or to what purpose, have given a treat to the vultures of Germany; to say nothing of those who will probably follow them, who will never revisit their native shore, unless perhaps in the letter of some surviving friends that may think their deaths worth specifying. -----
 " Oh, but they are perishing with propriety." ----- A just consolation this, no doubt, to their countrymen, friends and relations here, if that was quite so clear as it could be wished. In the mean time, the survivors there were even to be pitied for being exposed to the nauseous panegyric of their German general, for their valor; as if their valor had not, in Britons, been merely matter of course. Would to Heaven it had been more gloriously or more worthily employed! But if we had had those forces kept at home, instead of sending them to moulder away in battles to no end or avail, or by inclemency of weather, by diseases, and inanition, we might, without calling in Hanoverians to protect us, have safely laughed to scorn any terrors from a French invasion. We might have done more. We might, without the least rhodomontade, in case the French had wanted ships to transport them to this island, have obligingly accommodated them with ours to bring them over to the destruction that, at least most probably, would await them.

But that nothing might be wanting to fill up the measure of our indignities, while our treasures, and the lives of our countrymen are thus sacrificed in vain, this dispensation of them is even set down to us, as a very high favor done us; since, at the same time, in consideration of that application of so great a part of our wealth and forces, to the service, or, more properly, to the disservice of our continental connections, we are most graciously indulged with the leave to employ another part in that national channel, in which the successes obtained so evidently prove it to have been the only right channel, though from that o-
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ther collateral dispensation, they are so likely to be worse than frustrated.

One would here naturally enough imagine that the insult to the public understanding could not well be carried higher than in such a claim of merit to us, for what we have been permitted to do on a truly national footing. But this is not all yet. This great, this loyal nation, had not, it seems, of herself, so much interest as to obtain that precious favor of doing a little for herself in her own way, if but in return for all she was doing so much out of it. No. That favor must be attributed to the prodigious patriotism and powers of oratory in the man who by pointing out to his countrymen the breach at which their ruin was to rush in, acquired popularity enough for him, on the strength of it, to be thought worth the making a tool of by those who were hard at work on making that breach; whom he accordingly, with portentous intrepidity, joined in the widening it, and took the lead in throwing the whole wall down. But what did the poor, trusting, deceived, deluded people do on this occasion? ----- What did they do? They applauded him; and, with songs of triumph, fell to celebrating the wonderful blessings of UNANIMITY: Yes! of UNANIMITY!

And here, as we must expect, on entertaining the just sentiments of such a desertion, to be upbraidingly for ingratitude nosed with the remembrance of the glorious year 1759; let us to avoid and invalidate so detestable a charge, succinctly liquidate any claim of merit for the successes of that remarkable period; successes so often thrown in the teeth of the defenders of the insular system against those of the continental one; successes so much of the nature of those phænomena which, in natural philosophy, on a superficial view, seem to contradict and destroy a system; whereas, well examined, they only serve the more to confirm it.

But surely for Britain to have some distrust of such successes, there needed no more for her than not to forget the year 1757, equally glorious for the Prussians, and which yet produced so little solid advantage as perhaps ultimately at the winding up of things, to be not an unfit companion, for our famous year 1759.

It will not, however, I presume, be said that, of all the events of that year, I unfairly suppress the most brilliant ones, in selecting, for the proposed discussion, the reduction

on of Quebec, the battle of Minden, and the destruction of the French fleet by Admiral Hawke.

First, as to the reduction of Quebec, It is extremely well known, that while there was great care taken to send a large body of troops to Germany, poor Wolfe was suffered to try the fortune of war against a "superior enemy;*" to say nothing of the great "natural strength of the country." He himself very generously takes care to disculpate as far as in him lay, the ministry, by the following salving remark. "The affairs," says he, "of Great-Britain, I know require the most vigorous measures." --- By these "*affairs*" the reader may understand or not, just as he pleases or sees fitting, the consequences of the German draughts in our military strength, being such as to require the trusting for more execution to smaller numbers than perhaps would otherwise have been done. But, let that construction be as it will; is it possible to read, without the emotions of a concern mixed with indignation, the immediately following so pathetic words, which, respect being had to the time, may well be called the last dying words of that gallant officer? --- "BUT THEN," N. B. "BUT THEN *the courage of a HANDFUL OF MEN should be exerted only where there is some HOPE of a favourable event.*" Here you have the strongest attestation, an attestation sealed with Wolfe's own blood of the desperateness of that undertaking: an attestation which, I presume, it will hardly be said was extorted from him by his *cowardice*. Let all the merit then be granted that can be claimed for the choice of so able an officer to command that expedition, so much the greater reproach for exposing such an officer to so staring a likelihood of his being a sacrifice, together with all the troops under him: a disaster which, though himself did not personally escape, his troops, through his admirable management, victoriously did, by a stroke of despair. But, in the name of all that is just, is there any thing so little due to a minister as any praise or honor for any share he might have in the planning an enterprize where there was so staringly no "HOPE of a favorable event?" Or, Is it not treating the memory of Wolfe with infinite injustice, not to say ingratitude, to give him such an one for a partner in the glory of that ever memorable exertion of his; which was, in fact, the foundation of the ensuing conquest of all Canada? A country, of which, after the baffling of Vaudreuil's attempt

* WOLFE's Letter, dated September the 2d, 1759.

tempt on Quebec, when in our hands, the French were necessarily more glad and in a hurry to get rid, than we could be to take possession.

Secondly, as to the battle of Minden. There is not, perhaps, in the whole stream of history of human wars, a battle so unaccountable, so mysterious, so nothing-meaning as that same battle, whether you consider the dispositions on both sides, on that of the enemy or ours; or the issue of it, so little material, unless in encreasing our infatuation to draw us on to throw away more money and men in future campaigns, in a theatre so favorable to the French views of exhausting and tiring us out. In which light their defeat was, if not of more real service to them, most certainly of more detriment to us, than their victory would have been, if that victory would but have opened our eyes on the fruitlessness, or self-destruction, from the part we were acting. There is, however, in that battle, nothing clear*, unless the valor and intrepidity of our country-men, who barely not unprepared, as they were, showed the French, the difference between the sons of freedom and the puppets of slavery. But as to the personal consequences of this victory, into which the army had been evidently surprized, the two generals, the foreign and the British, had two very different fates. For as the one had all the glory of it, even himself would be extremely puzzled to tell for what: so the other was disgraced, there is no-one can possibly tell why. But in all this, what applause can redound to any British minister who had not, even in thought, any share in this battle; the very commander of which was not so much as subordinate to the authority

* Having mentioned a want of clearness in the battle itself, it is indeed no wonder that the accounts of it should partake of that obscurity. But in the Extraordinary Gazette of this victory, on Monday, August the 3d, 1759, there is a circumstance of which the relation is given in terms so contradictory, that if it had been dated from Ireland, I leave the impartial reader to figure to himself what a laugh it would have excited here. Speaking of the action of the body of troops under the hereditary Duke against the duke de Brissac, it is said, "At last, (the French) finding themselves ENTIRELY surrounded, they had no other resource but FLIGHT*."—With wings, as the expression imports, I presume; or through a trap-door. Surrounded might have passed, perhaps, under favor of a latitude of construction just allowable in a military sense, but "entirely! entirely!" one would imagine entirely took away that latitude.

of British councils, or amenable to British jurisdiction? Where on earth then, can any reason be alledged for any claim of merit in any minister for an event so palpably the produce of chance and of the sheer bravery of the British troops? Is there any base envy or detraction in the rejecting such a claim? Was there in Britain any old woman that, sitting comfortably by her fire-side at the time, might not justly boast of as great a share of merit in that same victory as any British minister, as to the planning part of it? And as to his being the cause of it, by the destination of the British forces to that particular theatre of the war, let the consequences, actual or probable, decide his pretensions; and, I fancy, that there will hardly be found any to dispute the glory of them with him.

Thirdly, as to the destruction of the French fleet by Admiral Hawke, and add, if you will, that of De la Clue's Squadron by the late gallant Admiral Boscawen; these are events which, I presume, might have taken place, even if there had not so much as "half a man" gone to Germany. To say the truth, they were on a footing so purely British, that every British heart must glow with pleasure at the remembrance of them; but with a just indignation too at that pleasure being necessarily to be adulterated with the reflexion on any drawback from their importance by the consequences of our continental connexions; and especially at any part of the honor of them being so ridiculously attributed to any one rather more justly accusable of having fore-robbed all our successes of their solidity, and rendered them as flashy as himself.

And indeed our successes, so circumstanced as they are, have less the air of blessings, than of being sent us in mockery of our politics; to prove to us that our system is absolutely so bad, that not even such successes could possibly mend it: while the system of the French, only from its not being an unnational one, and rather good by the badness of ours, than from any intrinsic worth of its own, is likely not to be materially hurt, in the end, by the wretchedness of their behaviour in the field, or the weakness of their councils in the cabinet.

Nor does it in the least derogate from this doubt of the stability of our successes, that we should not as yet feel, even in apprehension, the whole weight of the continental incumbrance; of which weight, our exportation of men and money is hitherto but a part. But in that very insensibility lay the snare. Thence the improvidence of running

headlong into alluring measures, big with future events, that must ultimately be sure to over-balance any momentary present advantage. Such events then could not come into existence before the fate of things should be decided on the continent; before our great ally should either be reduced to order, or tempted to make a separate peace. Of this last, indeed, it may be justly said, there needs not be much apprehension. Of a peace on any tolerable terms for him, there seems, from the condemned face of things with him, such little probability, that it is much more to be dreaded that all that is past, will have only been pastorals and rural sports upon the green, compared to the scenes of horror and carnage that may be expected in that theatre of war, where he is now playing surely no very enviable part. And indeed, the political horizon every where round, so far from clearing up, appears rather to thicken with the threats of war; which, thanks to our happy insular situation, can hardly be said to have begun yet with respect to us, unless indeed for those of our countrymen actually militating on the continent to no purpose, or in America, to what may possibly be as little, in the end, or at winding up of the account of our continental measures. May we not have to thank those measures for the experience that the opposite of a wrong is not always right; and that, if our supine inactivity, was at one period of time so just a matter of reproach, it did not at all follow, that all our stir and bustle since should be a whit preferable; but, that if our passive history was miserable indeed, our active was perhaps yet worse! While all our conduct, instead of expressing the even tenor of a regular, well-concerted national system, rather betrayed, in its incoherence, the wildness of a delirium, and that kind of convulsive fits and starts which raise a sick person for some instants above his weakness, only to replunge him into the greater languor, and approach him the nearer to his latter end. To say but the truth, our measures have been so much in the nature of a self-sacrifice, that even our enemies affect to pity us, amidst all our exultation in them; while our friends are really in pain for us, if but on their own account, and dare not connect with us.

In the mean time, we are pluming ourselves on the flourishing condition of our trade, especially in the time of actual war. And that condition, if true, is, in fact, one of the strongest demonstrations of the preferableness of a naval exertion, especially by an insular nation; since, as has been before remarked, the Dutch could thrive by a war on a maritime

a maritime plan, and especially on a purely national footing, to such a degree as, besides collaterally supporting their defence by land, they even grew rich and powerful. Never was that famous saying of Portius Cato more applicable than to the nature of a naval war. "War will feed itself*." But on this Britain might very well have reckoned, if she had been engaged singly with France, and even with two or three more nations at once; though not, perhaps, with all Europe; because, in that case, to say nothing of the hazard of the issue, the trade on which she depends, must perish for want of channels of intercourse, when every port would be shut up, or turned hostile to us.

I do not then mean here too scrupulously to scan this our pretension to prosperity of trade.

I will not enquire whether, in that boast, we have not overlooked some very just distinctions; whether, we have not a little precipitately mistaken a great deal of hollow bustle for solid business; or that stir of money or of the paper-representatives of money among remittancers, money-lenders to the public, jobbers, lottery-ticket-mongers, which the incurrence of such a debt as of thirty millions must necessarily create; for a proof of the augmentation of our trade and manufactures, besides what other proof may, and probably does, appear in their favor in the Custom-house books.

I do not examine whether the first mentioned kind of flourishing is not too much of the nature of the temporary emoluments of some of our sea-port towns, which, being chiefly the seats of an encreased expence, during a war, partially reckon it the best time for them; however, that local prosperity may very differently affect the general policy and welfare of the nation.

I do not mean here to liquidate the doubt, whether other nations have not much more than ourselves made their advantage of what is lost to the French trade and navigation by our destruction of them; whether the Dutch, the Danes, the Swedes, and especially the Spaniards, who have so lately improved their passive trade into an active one, besides other nations, all beginning to feel the sweets of trade, and consequently to enter effectually into the commercial spirit, must not proportionably diminish our dealings; whether even the French have not some amends made to them by the known and visible augmentation of their inland-trade; to say nothing of the channels open to them in neutral bottoms.

Neither do I propose discussing here whether that un-

measura-

* *Bellum se-ipsam alit.*

LIV.

measurable drain of specie by so many millions yearly being exported to the continent, has not already too sensibly and even dangerously increased that disproportion of the currency of paper-money to the specie in circulation, which was even before complained of.

All this I wave; which is not, perhaps, waving a little; and admit, in its full extent, this boasted augmentation of trade and manufactures; and of these last, which is most wonderful, even in spite of the supposable detriment to them, from the taking off so many hands by the exigencies of the war.

But, admitting this prosperity, are not we but so much more to be pitied for the cruel abuse of it? If the ballance of trade is really so much more in our favor, have we any great cause to boast of the millions which seem to be got by the laudable industry of the subject, only to be without measure or mercy flung down that insatiate gulph of our treasures which is for ever open to receive them; that country which incessantly drains them from us, all in a wild senseless waste, and even to its own perdition as well as ours; instead of their being retained in the nation, to be duly circulated through the body of it, so as to diffuse life, spirit and abundance through all the members?

Is not there also, in this same boast of our mercantile acquisition of riches, rather somewhat impolitic, considering the use that may occasionally be made of it against ourselves, both by friends and enemies? When the peace comes to be treated of (for after all it cannot be supposed that the war is to be eternal) and the indemnification of the parties that shall be found to have just pretensions to it, comes under consideration; I do not ask whether the French, and the rest of our enemies, will not naturally point us out for the proper supplemental pay-masters of any deficiency in our allies; but will not our allies themselves, on the being pinched by such demands, plausibly enough cry out, that since we ourselves confess the prosperity of our trade, and the augmentation of our opulence, in the midst of all the calamities of war, we must be the best able to afford sacrifices to a general peace? Especially too, since it is to our blessed connections with them, that the partizans of those connections affect to attribute those commercial successes. This boast, in short may not be amiss for answering certain pecuniary views at home; but for abroad: abroad: once more I say, may it not have an undesirable effect?

And here be it observed, that, by too many instances, it-but too plainly appears that, if we have declared war against the

the French, we have, in fact, carried it on less against them than against ourselves; in the openings we have furnished them; in the weak sides we have exposed to them, and especially in the contenting ourselves with hurting them, by not incurable random-wounds and chance-blows they have received, in the delirious agitation with which we have thrown about our arms, all the time not heeding that we are ourselves, if we do not take care, bleeding to death amidst all our *Io Pæans* and hymns of victory.

But may the course of this disorder remit or cease, while there is yet time to hope the crisis may not turn fatally against us! And here I appeal to every sensible candid reader, who will please to consider the present aspect of things, whether he can conceive that there ever could exist that point of time in which, more than in the present one, the crime would be not to say truth enough, as to the public affairs; or in which such truth was more wanted? And surely, those who to serve dare displease, do not, at least deserve the being suspected of meaning to deceive, or of offering what they do not sincerely take to be the truth.

Nor will Britons be the gainers of a little, however dear the experience may be bought, if they gain but such a just diffidence of the secret motives of the most plausible proposals to them; as henceforward, not to suffer their own virtues, their own love of country, to be turned against themselves; while by looking only on the fair side, that is presented to them, they do not stand to examine all the foul ones it may hide from them. But, by this means, they are not only barbarously made subservient to their own ruin; they are not only so captivated by false surfaces, as to applaud both the measures and the promoters of these measures, by which themselves, their families and posterity are so likely to suffer; but even to consider, in the light of enemies, those who wish them no worse than for them, to begin to think and judge for themselves, as the first step for them not to continue longer under the power of pernicious illusions. And who would wish to see a people deceived that deserve it so little, especially from those by whom they have the most been so? A people that, with all their faults and follies, (and what people has not some, only less happily compensated?) may still be demonstrated to be the most worthy, the most noble-spirited, and the most amiable people on the face of the earth.

And here, to the most ungrateful task of stating causes of fear or apprehension for the public welfare, succeeds the most

most agreeable prospect of the hopes of its retrieval or establishment by the only way that it can possibly be retrieved or established. And from my making use of the expression "the only way," I presume myself so much already anticipated by every reader in the ascertainment of it, that I scarce need to specify it; since what other way can there possibly be imagined, unless the constitutional exertion of power by the representatives of the nation in parliament?

If it is just to say that, humanly speaking, this nation cannot well be undone, but by the neglect, the indolence, the corruption, or the prevarication of a parliament; it is also as just to aver, that, in any conjuncture of danger, it is only by a parliament that she can be defended from it, and that effectual care can be taken that her welfare receives no detriment.

Such an assembly as that must undoubtedly be supposed to contain a number of unexceptionable subjects, untainted with corruption or factiousness, neutrals as to any of the parties that have been seen to disgrace the political drama, and alike ridiculous in their most illustrious quarrels, as in their most serene unanimity; neutrals, I say, in whom great talents, united to the advantages of birth, rank and fortune, form a merit that must render them infinitely superior to any thing so extremely low, as the stooping to be the implicit tame tools of any little ministers to whom, was their country even dear to them, nothing is perhaps less known than its Good, or their own either.

It is then greatly to be hoped, or, at least, not to be despaired of, that the nation will not look up in vain to representatives worthy of her sacred trust in them. It is not of such as these that there will be to be said, that they have silly thrown away immense sums to get into parliament only for the dishonor of being wanting to their duty, as if such a station was any protection against a just contempt, a plea of privilege to be worthless; or, rather, not a reproach the more, and the keener for being so.

It is not the men of solid sense that, at least in the cool of their minds, on reflecting upon what is past, will be liable to be dazzled with the glare of false brilliants, that will take figures of flowered fustian, or theatrical rants for genuine eloquence, vehemence for sincerity, the petulance of invective for the true spirit of liberty, and much less yet for that of patriotism. It is not, in short, on such as these, that out-brazening will pass for out-reasoning.

And surely, in the present position of things, no incentive can

can be wanting to the representatives of their country, to do her justice. Their own stake in the land, their own honor, and, what ought not to go for a little, the presumable horror and disdain in them of resembling, in any thing, certain personages, must all conspire to recommend to them their not deserting her in the present, and perhaps never greater need.

From men then of spirit, of taste, and of true worth, better things may be expected, than that meanness, of all meannesses surely the most vulgar and the most despicable; the imagining it to be something of a fine superb air, that of pretending to repair wrongs by a pernicious persistence in them, and of nosing, in a silly bravade, the protestation of even their own sense and judgment against them.

At least, they could not have for excuse any difficulty of knowing what to think of the merit of certain past transactions; such, for example, as the renewal of the broken ties with the continent, and the re-involving us with it after the breach of the convention; of any share in the guilt of which it is to be hoped that this nation will upon a fair examination, be amply cleared, to the satisfaction of all Europe, of any authority having been, in a national way, given to any of her subjects to abet such a perfidy as the French have dared to impute to her, who are themselves, it seems, the criminals.

It is then still happily in the power of the constitutional guardians of this country, to show to the astonished Universe, a sight truly worthy of the majesty of a great and free people; a sight that might do honor to the Romans even in the greatest days of Rome; the sight of a nation, by her legal representatives, severely mounting the supreme tribunal of her own judicature, there entering into judgment with herself, and even, where natural equity should require it, not scrupling to condemn herself. An effort of which, nothing but the sublimest virtue could make her capable, as well as the justest policy recommend to her, for the replacing her interest once more on her national bottom, and for repairing any breaches both in that and in her reputation, which have suffered so deeply for her having stood tottering so long on a diminutive foreign one. And thus this nation, proceeding only the more formidable for such a display of the union of her justice with her power, could not fail of striking terror into her enemies, at the same time that she will re-invite the forfeited confidence of her discouraged or disgusted friends and natural allies.

T H E E N D.

110.



T H E I H D

